{"id":930,"date":"2013-06-28T20:27:43","date_gmt":"2013-06-28T20:27:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/?p=930"},"modified":"2016-06-19T12:23:02","modified_gmt":"2016-06-19T12:23:02","slug":"letter-to-george-mcclellan-october-13-1862","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/letter-to-george-mcclellan-october-13-1862\/","title":{"rendered":"Letter to George McClellan (October 13, 1862)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>Contributing Editors for this page include Brian Elsner and Susan Segal<\/em><\/p>\n<h3><strong>Ranking<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><em><span style=\"color: #0000ff; font-size: 36px;\">#44<\/span> on the list of 150 Most Teachable Lincoln Documents<\/em><\/p>\n<h3>Annotated Transcript<\/h3>\n<p><em><strong>Context.\u00a0<\/strong><\/em>George Brinton McClellan was appointed the Commander of the Army of the Potomac in 1861 and then General-in-Chief later that year. In March of 1862, he was removed as the General-in-Chief while he was away from Washington as part of the Peninsula Campaign. Then, on November 5, 1862, he was removed as Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Although McClellan was popular with the troops under his command, who called him \u201cLittle Mac,\u201d he had vocal critics in the Republican-controlled Congress and President Lincoln had become increasingly frustrated with McClellan\u2019s delays in pursuing the enemy. This letter from October 13, 1862, less than a month after the Union victory at Antietam (Sharpsburg), clearly illustrates that frustration. (By Susan Segal)<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/40404\" target=\"_blank\">&#8220;Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?&#8221;<\/a><\/p>\n<h3>Audio Version<\/h3>\n<iframe loading=\"lazy\" width=\"100%\" height=\"166\" scrolling=\"no\" frameborder=\"no\" src=\"https:\/\/w.soundcloud.com\/player?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.soundcloud.com%2Ftracks%2F120712743&visual=true\"><\/iframe>\n<h3>On This Date<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/today_in_history?q=panel\/this_date\/1862-10-13\">HD Daily Report, October 13, 1862<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.thelincolnlog.org\/Results.aspx?type=CalendarDay&amp;day=1862-10-13\" target=\"_blank\">The Lincoln Log, October 13, 1862<\/a><\/p>\n<h3>Close Readings<\/h3>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/NzBXLax4NDo\" width=\"420\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Posted at YouTube by &#8220;Understanding Lincoln&#8221; participant Susan Segal, October 18, 2013.\u00a0See also Segal&#8217;s\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/abrahamlincoln.quora.com\/Understanding-Lincoln-Third-Close-Reading\" target=\"_blank\">blog post (via Quora), September 29, 2013<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.quora.com\/Brian-Elsner\/Posts\/Close-Reading-2-Abraham-Lincoln-to-George-Brinton-McClellan-October-13-1862\" target=\"_blank\">Brian Elsner, &#8220;Understanding Lincoln&#8221; blog post (via Quora), October 7, 2013<\/a><\/p>\n<h3>Custom Map<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/maps.google.com\/maps\/ms?msid=214923210427089848626.0004def4e79e2ae545ca4&amp;msa=0&amp;ll=39.448654,-77.712994&amp;spn=0.106442,0.191059&amp;iwloc=lyrftr:msid:214923210427089848626.0004def4e79e2ae545ca4,0004e061dc216d7277b62,,,0,-63\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-3469\" src=\"http:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/files\/2013\/06\/10.13-mccllan.png\" alt=\"10.13 mccllan\" width=\"416\" height=\"463\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/maps.google.com\/maps\/ms?msid=214923210427089848626.0004def4e79e2ae545ca4&amp;msa=0&amp;ll=39.448654,-77.712994&amp;spn=0.106442,0.191059&amp;iwloc=lyrftr:msid:214923210427089848626.0004def4e79e2ae545ca4,0004e061dc216d7277b62,,,0,-63\" target=\"_blank\">View in larger map<\/a><\/p>\n<h3>How Historians Interpret<\/h3>\n<p>\u201cIf Lee stayed put at Winchester, Lincoln urged, the Army of the Potomac should \u2018fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us, than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the entrenchments of Richmond.\u2019 After describing how the Union army could be easily supplied as it moved toward the Confederate capital, Lincoln assured Little Mac that his letter was \u2018in no sense an order.\u2019 Lincoln feared that this admonition would have little effect, even though it implicitly gave McClellan only one last chance to redeem himself.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&#8211;Michael Burlingame,\u00a0<em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.knox.edu\/documents\/pdfs\/LincolnStudies\/Burlingame,%20Vol%202,%20Chap%2029.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">Abraham Lincoln: A Life<\/a>\u00a0<\/em>(2 volumes, originally published by Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) Unedited Manuscript by Chapter, Lincoln Studies Center, Volume 2, Chapter 29 (PDF), 3153.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>\u201cBy failing to attack the enemy, McClellan had made too many personal enemies to remain much longer in command of the North\u2019s foremost army. Lincoln wanted McClellan to get back across the Potomac and engage with Lee, but, as a delay followed delay, the frustration of both the president and the senior command reached breaking point. In mid-October, Lincoln wrote to McClellan, in one of the longest communications he ever sent to his general, setting out the situation as he saw it. He pointed out that \u2018you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you <em>can, <\/em>and he <em>must <\/em>take. Why can you not reach there before him\u2026 his route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his\u2026 If we cannot beat the enemy where he is now,\u2019 Lincoln warned, \u2018we never can.\u2019 It was to no avail. Toward the end of the month, Lincoln\u2019s patience was clearly running out.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&#8211;Susan-Mary Grant, <a href=\"https:\/\/books.google.com\/books?id=1ktsBAAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PA237&amp;dq=Lincoln+Letter+to+George+McClellan+13+October+1862&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwid8MXi5qzNAhUFcT4KHRZOBFoQ6wEIRDAG#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false\" target=\"_blank\"><em>The War for a Nation<\/em> <\/a>(London: Routledge, 2006), 140.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #000000;\">NOTE TO READERS<\/span><\/h3>\n<p>This page is under construction and will be developed further by students in the new \u201cUnderstanding Lincoln\u201d online course sponsored by the House Divided Project at Dickinson College and the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History. To find out more about the course and to see some of our videotaped class sessions, including virtual field trips to Ford&#8217;s Theatre and Gettysburg, please visit our Livestream page at <a href=\"http:\/\/new.livestream.com\/gilderlehrman\/lincoln\" target=\"_blank\">http:\/\/new.livestream.com\/gilderlehrman\/lincoln<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">Searchable Text<\/span><\/h3>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">Executive Mansion,\u00a0Washington, Oct. 13, 1862.<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">Major General McClellan<\/span><\/div>\n<div><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">My dear Sir\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">As I understand, you telegraph Gen. Halleck that you can not subsist your army at Winchester unless the Railroad from Harper&#8217;s Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper C.H. which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper&#8217;s Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the Railroad from Harper&#8217;s Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and, in fact ignores the question of time, which can not, and must not be ignored.<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is &#8220;to operate upon the enemy&#8217;s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.&#8221; You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twentyfour hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow, and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon, and beat what is left behind all the easier.<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can, and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march. His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below, instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemies&#8217; communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move Northward I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least, try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say &#8220;try&#8221;; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither North or South, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us, than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the entrenchments of Richmond.<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable&#8212;as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim&#8212;and this whether you move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Hay-Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turn-pikes, railroads, and finally, the Potomac by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper&#8217;s Ferry, towit: Vestal&#8217;s five miles; Gregorie&#8217;s, thirteen, Snicker&#8217;s eighteen, Ashby&#8217;s, twenty-eight, Mannassas, thirty-eight, Chester fortyfive, and Thornton&#8217;s fiftythree. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length, running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way; if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to say they can not do it.<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">This letter is in no sense an order.<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">Yours truly<\/span><\/div>\n<div><span style=\"color: #c0c0c0;\">A. LINCOLN<\/span><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Contributing Editors for this page include Brian Elsner and Susan Segal Ranking #44 on the list of 150 Most Teachable Lincoln Documents Annotated Transcript Context.\u00a0George Brinton McClellan was appointed the Commander of the Army of the Potomac in 1861 and then General-in-Chief later that year. In March of 1862, he was removed as the General-in-Chief [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10857],"tags":[10877,6088,11642,11630,10865,10862],"class_list":["post-930","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-father-abraham","tag-advice","tag-letter","tag-management-style","tag-military-affairs","tag-private","tag-wartime"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/930","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=930"}],"version-history":[{"count":28,"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/930\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4365,"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/930\/revisions\/4365"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=930"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=930"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=930"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}