At Quora, the social question & answer website, we have posted the following essential question to help teachers and students organize their thoughts on some of the documents within the Father Abraham theme:<\/p>\n
How did Lincoln’s own contemporaries respond to his leadership?<\/a><\/p>\n You can view (and vote) on all of the answers to this question at Quora, which is a free site but one that requires registration. Or you can see excerpts from some of the most thought-provoking answers below:<\/p>\n <\/p>\n I\u00a0am left wondering how broad we ought to define the term \u201ccontemporaries.\u201d\u00a0 Do we confine ourselves to Lincoln\u2019s Congress, Lincoln\u2019s cabinet, Lincoln\u2019s generals?\u00a0 After all, it is not only every Union general who was Lincoln\u2019s contemporary–it was also every Union soldier; every family member of a Union soldier (think of Mrs. Lydia Bixby); every individual who bought a war bond; every farmer and every stevedore and every factory worker producing the materiel of war.\u00a0 Each of them played their own part in the war\u2019s outcome.\u00a0 In many of these cases, I am sure, these individuals felt something like a personal connection to their president.\u00a0 Ultimately, everybody within the physical boundaries of the Union ought to count as Lincoln\u2019s contemporaries (perhaps we ought to include many who were outside the physical boundaries of the Union, as well–say, for instance, the attitudes of the more than three million men, women, and children held as bondsmen within the Confederacy). Perhaps the best test of Lincoln\u2019s leadership is the simple fact that he was re-elected in 1864, after so many paid such a high price for a war whose conclusion was not yet known.\u00a0 Or that the Union ended in many ways stronger at the conclusion of the war than at the outset, with a larger economy, with a more numerous population, etc.<\/p>\n Lincoln was respected by his contemporaries as he blended men from all segments of society into a coalition force to quell the crisis of the 1860s.\u00a0 His own Cabinet was made up of competitors and ambitious men.\u00a0\u00a0 Lincoln thought these men would serve a purpose.\u00a0\u00a0Don Fehrenbacher\u2019s 1987 article <\/a>from the\u00a0Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association\u00a0<\/i>explains leadership as relying on reciprocal influence between leaders and followers where there is an \u201cassimilation or sharing of purpose.\u201d\u00a0 Lincoln and his contemporaries shared in their purpose for reuniting the nation in peace.\u00a0 The key to Lincoln\u2019s leadership success is the recognition of his own limitations and the effort he took to position the right people in the right jobs at the right time.\u00a0 It may have taken a few tries to be successful in his appointments, but eventually Lincoln mobilized the political and military personnel to achieve an end to the war and the end to slavery.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Judging from the collection of 5 personal letters explored under the “Father Abraham” theme, the one word that seems to best characterize Lincoln’s leadership relationship with his contemporaries is “approachable”.\u00a0 People from all roles were very comfortable with Lincoln.\u00a0 They were not afraid to criticize him as a person- nor to criticize his decisions and policies.\u00a0 However Lincoln rolled with the punches and seemed able to co-opt their support and direct them towards working on the ends that he saw them best able to accomplish given their talents,\u00a0 Personal politics might limit the support of a contemporary, but it didn’t seem to limit Lincoln’s support for those he appointed to office, or to command. \u00a0See full answer at Quora<\/a><\/p>\n Some of Lincoln\u2019s leadership skills in general helped him in his leadership as the Commander-in-Chief from the start.\u00a0 He was smart, had a keen ability to adapt to the circumstances, and was willing to admit error and learn from it.\u00a0 However, his early hesitancy to bring his generals, such as McClellan, to task was a drawback.\u00a0 It is true that Lincoln\u2019s military experience was limited and he often joked about his lack of it, stating, he had “a good many bloody struggles with the Musquetoes” rather than the enemy when he served during the Black Hawk War (McPherson 2008<\/a>).\u00a0 Nonetheless, after reading the things General McClellan said and did or did not do, I am left curious as to why Lincoln put up with McClellan for so long (sixteen months).<\/p>\n Bruce Tap\u2019s description <\/a>of the congressional members who were a part of the Committee on the Conduct of the War suggests that they would fall into the group of people who were frustrated with and doubtful of Lincoln\u2019s leadership.\u00a0 After all, the Committee was founded after the Union didn\u2019t experience the quick win that most members expected; members of this group wanted to investigate why the North wasn\u2019t winning so rapidly. Although Tap suggests that committee members blamed the South, West Point professional army members, and Democrats for military losses, they must also have blamed Lincoln, to some extent, for he was the Commander in Chief. Although they were less experienced in war matters than Lincoln, if they were the\u201d narrow-minded partisans, blinded by their own sense of importance and self-righteousness\u201d they must have been annoyed by Lincoln\u2019s reluctance to not join them in casting blame.<\/p>\n One of the chief criticisms of Lincoln as a supposed tyrant was his suspension of habeas corpus<\/em> during the Civil War. Similar to the criticisms of recent presidents and their treatment of prisoners-of-war at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, Lincoln decided that the \u201crebellion\u201d called for this suspension of civil liberties. In Lincoln\u2019s letter to Erastus Corning (a Democratic congressman who had organized a public hearing on the war that questioned Lincoln\u2019s war tactics), Lincoln defends the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. He states: \u201cIf I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public Safety does not require them—in other words, that the constitution is not in it’s application in all respects the same, in cases of Rebellion or invasion, involving the public Safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security\u201d (Document #39<\/a>). President Lincoln in effect statedthat the Constitution didn\u2019t apply in this case because of the war. He essentially changed the \u201crules\u201d in order to defend the public as he saw fit. Of course, not everyone \u2013 friends included \u2013 agreed with how Lincoln viewed civil liberties at that time.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Lincoln\u2019s response to Reverdy Johnson<\/a>\u00a0(Doc. #14)\u00a0summed up his response to all criticisms. \u201cI am a patient man\u2014always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance; and also to give ample time for repentance. Still I must save this government if possible. What I cannot do, of course I will not do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed.\u201d\u00a0 Lincoln was clear and uncompromising regarding any actions he had taken or might need to take in order to restore the nation.<\/p>\n Dealing with his generals was an almost constant trial for Lincoln. In his 1862 letter to General McClellan <\/a>he responds to the general\u2019s complaints by concisely summing up the current situation the troops faced and ending with \u201cI beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But\u00a0you must act<\/i>.\u201d Lincoln applies a verbal kick in the pants in an attempt to motivate his errant general to fight. The letter he wrote to General Hooker in 1863<\/a> was at times stern and paternal. Lincoln notes aspects of Hooker\u2019s character and action for which he approves while also scolding him for intemperate speech and poor judgment. Hooker clearly felt that Lincoln was acting paternally. Burlingame notes \u201cHooker thought it was \u2018just such a letter as a father might write to a son.\u2019\u201d The letter to Ulysses S. Grant<\/a> is masterful. It is 1865 and the war is near its end. Lincoln is at once both the Commander-in-Chief and a father requesting a favor for his son. He calls Grant his friend and assures him that he can decline Lincoln\u2019s request if he wishes.<\/p>\nStep 1: \u00a0Defining Terms<\/em><\/strong><\/h2>\n
<\/h3>\n
Brian Harding on defining “contemporaries”<\/h3>\n
Rhonda Webb on defining “leadership”<\/span><\/h3>\n
Step 2: \u00a0Establishing Range<\/strong><\/em><\/h3>\n
Paul Frankmann on Lincoln’s “Approachability”<\/h3>\n
Susan Segal on Lincoln and his generals<\/h3>\n
Emily Trono on Lincoln and Congress<\/h3>\n
Brian Elsner on Lincoln and civil libertarians<\/h3>\n
Step 3: Prioritizing Evidence<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\n
Nancy Lewis on Lincoln’s letter to Reverdy Johnson<\/h3>\n
Janet Anders on Lincoln’s letters to his generals<\/h3>\n
Kory Loyola takes a different view of Lincoln’s 1865 letter to Grant<\/h3>\n